Escaping the False Dilemma of Strategic Nuclear and Biological Deterrence by Edwards, Brett
        
Citation for published version:
Edwards, B 2015, 'Escaping the False Dilemma of Strategic Nuclear and Biological Deterrence', Contemporary






Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in [JOURNAL TITLE] on [date of
publication], available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Seth Baum's proposal has been understood as naïve and misguided by several academics and 
experts working in disarmament and has been subject to sustained criticism. They claim that 
Baum's thought experiment relies on a grossly oversimplified understanding of the nature of, 
and relationship between, biological and nuclear security. 
Historically, faith in nuclear deterrence has contributed to the decision of at least one state to 
limit its biological weapon aspirations.1 However, this does not mean that the international 
norm against biological weapons is, or should be, subservient to the nuclear disarmament 
challenge. Indeed, as Nicholas Sims notes in making this point, from a disarmament 
perspective it is the nuclear sector which lags behind the international biological and 
chemical weapon treaties.2 Furthermore, analysis of historical programmes as well as 
contemporary assessments of biological weapons clearly points to the conclusion that 
biological weapons are neither strategically, technically or ethically suitable replacements for 
existing nuclear stockpiles. This means that Dr Baum's approach is in no way reconcilable 
with the understandings of those who have critiqued his work publicly. As I have noted 
previously, Baum's tentative hypothesis is not convincing enough to overturn the major 
canons of biological disarmament. Furthermore, it would be misguided to invest time and 
effort assessing this particular policy programme, in both ethical and practical terms.3 
The key value of Baum's academic thought experiment has been that the paper has stimulated 
reflection on the reasons why biological weapons are not, and should not be, part of today's 
military arsenals. Such a discussion is important, as in recent years the question of ‘why’ 
biological weapons are prohibited has often taken a backseat to the distinct question of ‘how’ 
biological weapons are prohibited. It is apparent, for example, that the emergence of concerns 
about terrorism since 2001 has contributed to further stigmatization of biological weapons, 
which has meant that less emphasis has been placed on the need for reflection upon why all 
forms of biological weaponry are prohibited. There are of course a wide range of reasons why 
such prohibitions continue, which go beyond those immediately elicited by Baum's proposal. 
With this in mind, I want to take the opportunity afforded by this symposium to outline two 
key approaches to arguing against Baum's proposal. 
The first approach, which I refer to as the ‘modular’ approach, accepts, for the purposes of 
argument, the initial terms of the deal proposed by Baum. In this approach arguments about 
the desirability of biological weapons are reduced to technical discussions about their 
suitability as a strategic deterrent weapon in terms of ascribed intrinsic qualities. In the papers 
by Gregory Koblentz and Martin Furmanski for example, several characteristics are identified 
which make biological weapons unsuitable as a ‘like for like’ replacement of nuclear 
weapons as a strategic deterrent.4 This includes unpredictability, the existence of defences 
against biological weapons and the untested nature of such weapons. However, relying 
exclusively on such an approach would allow a number of misguided assumptions within the 
proposal to go unchallenged. This risks framing the debate in terms of the immediate utility 
of biological weapons in a specific scenario, to the neglect of reflecting on the unintended 
consequences of pursuing the development of such weapons as well as the political feasibility 
of pursuing this option. It is these concerns which form the basis of the second approach to 
arguing against Baum's proposal, which I refer to as the ‘false dichotomy’ approach. This 
approach challenges more fundamental assumptions about the world in which nuclear 
weapons exist in, pointing to the unintended consequences of Dr Baum's proposal. 
The first unintended consequences relate to the rolling-back the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention. This would be entirely necessary if biological weapons were to be developed 
and stockpiled as a strategic deterrent by states. This would open the door for other states to 
pursue such capabilities, and have impacts upon other disarmament treaties. Such a situation 
would potentially lead to numerous states, including states which are currently non-nuclear, 
to pursue programmes which would destabilize international security and pose grave risks to 
public safety. One needs only to look at the available historical safety records of the secret 
offensive programmes involving weaponized agents,5 and indeed even much more recent 
biodefense and public health work, to be convinced that the development of such weapons, 
anywhere, would raise significant risks. Added to this, as has also been noted by Furmanski, 
such development would likely be understood to necessitate secretive research involving 
humans.6 
In relation to the issue of political feasibility, it would appear that Dr Baum's piece suffers 
from a fundamental internal inconsistency. This is because the motivation for his paper 
appears to be a concern that states ignore the massive, low probability and unintended 
consequences of maintaining existing nuclear stockpiles. Yet, his paper amounts to an 
argument that states, such as the US, should pursue a policy, based on assumed long-term 
gains, which would raise a host of more immediate and tangible risks to their own national 
safety and security. These issues have already been discussed at length, and I will not go into 
them here. It is worth noting however, that offensive programmes would also require huge 
financial resources. For example, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union invested over 
USD 35 billion into its offensive programme between 1972 and 1992.7 Although this 
programme covered a wide range of projects, it is indicative of the type of costs associated 
with such programmes by one superpower. There is of course also a real potential for arms 
races to develop in terms of offensive and defensive work which would justify further 
significant and sustained investment by states involved. If a small nuclear arsenal was to be 
maintained alongside this capacity, as Baum maintains, it would seem that little of this cost 
could be offset against cutbacks on nuclear spending. In contrast, the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, an international body with a verification system, has an 
annual budget less than USD 100 million.8 Arms control must be a cheaper alternative. 
Further to this, Baum's argument that it is worth reflecting on and assessing the feasibility of 
such a strategy also suffers from the same inconsistency, as it is essentially a call for further, 
and by necessity, secretive research by states into the viability of biological weapons as 
strategic deterrents which would straddle the distinction between offensive and defensive 
biological research. Some of this work would carry with it the type of security and safety 
implications just discussed. It makes little sense then for states to take such a gamble in order 
to address the unprovable claim that such actions could potentially avert a catastrophe that 
they do not fully comprehend.9 
Our time would be much better served in finding other ways to challenge the prevailing 
wisdom, institutions and political systems which propagate the maintenance of such sizeable 
arsenals. Indeed, as stated by a colleague recently in response to the debate, this is political 
software as well as a military hardware issue.10 
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